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Executive Branch Fact Deference as 
a Separation of Powers Principle 
EMILY A. KILE* 
On March 17, 2011, responding to human rights violations by the Libyan govern-
ment, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973,1 “establishing 
a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, authorizing strong enforcement of [an] arms em-
bargo, and encouraging member states to protect civilians without occupying 
Libya.”2 Two days later, President Barack Obama commenced Operation Odyssey 
Dawn to enforce the no-fly zone with air strikes and provided a report to Congress 
“‘consistent with’ the [War Powers Resolution].”3 Under the War Powers Resolu-
tion, President Obama had a maximum of sixty days to engage in military action 
without congressional approval before he would be required to withdraw.4 As the 
sixty-day clock expired, though, President Obama ignited a constitutional and statu-
tory firestorm by failing to withdraw. He took the position, instead, that the air strikes 
in Libya did not constitute “hostilities” as contemplated by the War Powers 
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 1. S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 2. Eileen Burgin, Where’s the Consultation? The War Powers Resolution and Libya, 12 
U.N.H. L. REV. 175, 189 (2014); see also S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 1, ¶¶ 6–12, 13–16, 4–5. 
 3. Burgin, supra note 2, at 189. President Obama did not seek congressional authoriza-
tion before initiating air strikes, with support from an Office of Legal Counsel opinion justi-
fying the use of force without prior congressional approval due to limited “nature, duration, 
and scope” of the air strikes. Id. at 189–90. The validity of that legal analysis is beyond the 
scope of this Note’s analysis. Other scholars have provided much more detailed analyses of 
the Office of Legal Counsel memorandum and the legality of initiating Operation Odyssey 
Dawn without prior congressional approval. See Bruce Ackerman, Response, Lost Inside the 
Beltway: A Reply to Professor Morrison, 124 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 13, 36–37 (2011); Ganesh 
Sitaraman, Essay, Credibility and War Powers, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 123 (2014); 
Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on the Justice Department’s 
Libya Opinion, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (Apr. 14, 2011, 2:57 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2011/04 
/the-cost-of-empty-words-a-comment-on-the-justice-departments-libya-opinion-2/ [https://perma 
.cc/XW3Z-VHTZ]; Jack Goldsmith, War Power: The President’s Campaign Against Libya Is 
Constitutional, SLATE  (Mar. 21, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and 
_politics/jurisprudence/2011/03/war_power.single.html [https://perma.cc/RCE9-WN2U?type 
=image]; David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Why Obama’s Libya Strikes Don’t Require 
Congressional Approval, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/opinions/why-obamas-libya-strikes-dont-require-congressional-approval/2011/03/24/AB9nx 
MQB_story.html [https://perma.cc/X27A-8WNB].  
 4. Burgin, supra note 2, at 190. 
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Resolution, and therefore the sixty-day clock did not apply, and he was not required 
to withdraw.5 
The vast majority of commentators (including members of Congress) disagreed 
with the Obama Administration’s legal analysis and conclusions.6 State Department 
Legal Advisor Harold Koh testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
arguing that the air strikes did not constitute hostilities for a combination of four 
factors: (1) the mission of the air strikes was limited, as the United States was merely 
supporting a North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation to enforce the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution; (2) the exposure of U.S. forces was limited 
because there were no active exchanges of fire or threat of casualties to U.S. forces; 
(3) the risk of escalation was limited because there were no ground troops; and (4) the 
military means employed were limited, because the violence inflicted by U.S. forces 
was “modest in terms of its frequency, intensity, and severity.”7 
The disagreement over the meaning of “hostilities” represents exactly the type of 
separation of powers dispute between Congress and the President that courts are re-
luctant to resolve on the merits.  Particularly in matters of foreign affairs, war, and 
                                                                                                             
 
 5. Id. at 191. The sixty-day clock begins when U.S. forces are introduced “into hostilities 
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum-
stances.” 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (2012); see also Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: Presi-
dential Power and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 117 (1995) (“The 
Resolution starts a sixty-day clock when ‘United States Armed Forces are introduced . . . into 
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by 
the circumstances.’” (omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting § 1543(a))). The 
Resolution itself does not define “hostilities,” but there is some evidence that at least one 
drafter of the Resolution intended for “hostilities” to be interpreted broadly, therefore applying 
to limit more military operations: Representative Clement J. Zablocki, a co-author of the Reso-
lution, criticized President Carter and his administration for “attempt[ing] to narrowly define 
‘imminent involvement in hostilities’ with respect to section 4(a)(1). . . . Such definitions and 
assertions constituted nothing more than calculated efforts to limit situations in which WRP 
[sic] provisions were relevant.” Clement J. Zablocki, War Powers Resolution: Its Past Record 
and Future Promise, 17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 579, 585–86 (1984) (quoting § 1543(a)). 
 6. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Military Operations in Libya: No War? No Hostilities?, 42 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 176 (2012); Jordan J. Paust, Constitutionality of U.S. Participation in 
the United Nations-Authorized War in Libya, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 43 (2012). Much of the 
criticism of the Obama Administration’s “hostilities” determination has focused on the fact 
that President Obama reportedly ignored the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion that the air 
strikes did constitute hostilities in favor of the State Department’s opposite conclusion. See, 
e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” The Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process 
of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 62, 65 (2011); Charlie 
Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html [https://perma.cc/F6JU 
-C4AY]. That discussion is beyond the scope of this Note.  
 7. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th 
Cong. 7, 9 (2011) (statement of Hon. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State). 
Koh emphasized the fact that at this point, U.S. forces had “shift[ed] to a constrained and 
supporting role in a multinational civilian protection mission . . . authorized by a carefully 
tailored U.N. Security Council Resolution.” Id. at 12 (prepared statement). 
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national security,8 courts are hesitant to “curb the federal political branches . . . and 
have even developed doctrines of special deference to them” that lead courts to refuse 
to disturb decisions of the political branches.9 The political question doctrine is one 
such deference regime courts sometimes employ as a function of the separation of 
powers.10 Recent developments in political question jurisprudence, though, suggest 
that when federal statutes are involved, courts might not invoke the political question 
doctrine and might instead more often decide disputes between the political branches 
on the merits. Part I of this Note explores the history of the political question doctrine 
and its evolution in the Court’s decision in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton 
(Zivotofsky I).11  
Part II examines existing explanations for the recent increased activism by the 
Supreme Court in the realm of foreign affairs, showing that Zivotofsky I may be part 
of a broader and desirable trend. Part III of this Note, however, explores a second 
form of judicial deference: deference given to the executive branch’s factual findings 
in areas of foreign affairs, national security, and war powers.12 One recent case in 
                                                                                                             
 
 8. The terms “foreign affairs,” “war,” and “national security” are not always used inter-
changeably, but scholars have long noted that the distinction among them is not always clear. 
E.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 6 (2d ed. 1996) (“Implied 
[in a book about foreign affairs] is that for this purpose ‘foreign affairs’ can be defined, iso-
lated, distinguished. That is hardly obvious. In many aspects of national economic life, for 
example, the domestic and the foreign are thoroughly mixed.”). There is inarguably a distinc-
tion between domestic powers and foreign affairs or national security powers when it comes 
to defining what the powers of the President are in any given situation. See., e.g., Roy E. 
Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & POL. 1, 22 (2000) (discussing 
an “understanding that the President possesses greater constitutional authority in national se-
curity affairs than he does in the domestic arena”). The precise contours of that distinction, 
though, are a matter of intense debate, as are the exact distinctions between the related con-
cepts of “foreign affairs,” “war powers,” and “national security.” For example, scholars are 
intensely divided as to whether the famous case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579 (1952), involving a president’s seizure of the nation’s steel mills to prevent a 
wartime crisis, involved a question of domestic authority, foreign affairs, or national security. 
See Brownell, supra, at 79–80 (summarizing commentators divided among the case’s classi-
fication as a “national security,” “foreign affairs,” or “domestic” war powers case). For pur-
poses of this Note, I consider the terms to be interchangeable to the extent that they involve 
similar claims by the executive branch that separation of powers principles require deference 
to its findings of fact or legal conclusions.    
 9. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 132.  
 10. Id. at 133 n.* (footnote referring to “political question” doctrine and judicial review 
as “aspects of ‘separation of powers’ between the Executive and the Judiciary”); see also 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is 
primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). 
 11. 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).  
 12. See, e.g., Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the End of War, 99 MINN. L. REV. 143, 209 
(2014) (describing such deference as appearing in situations in which “the executive’s superior 
expertise and access to information, its need to protect operational security and efficiency, and 
its direct accountability to the voters, are said to justify the executive’s demand that the Court 
defer to its findings of fact”). 
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particular—Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project13—gives rise to a concern that fed-
eral courts are giving excessive deference to executive branch fact-finding, a phe-
nomenon referred to throughout this Note as “executive branch fact deference.”14 
Part III of this Note examines these two forms of deference as applied in Zivotofsky 
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II).15 It concludes that excessive executive 
branch fact deference threatens to offset the improvements to executive branch ac-
countability garnered from Zivotofsky I’s less aggressive version of political question 
doctrine deference. When it replaces the political question doctrine and performs 
functionally the same role, executive branch fact deference is just another separation 
of powers principle.  
Finally, Part IV of this Note explores the possible ramifications of, these two de-
velopments in combination, namely, (1) courts finding certain questions related to 
statutory interpretation justiciable as in Zivotofsky I and (2) courts deferring to exec-
utive branch fact finding as in Zivotofsky II. Specifically, it applies the reasoning of 
Zivotofsky I and Zivotofsky II to consider application of the War Powers Resolution’s 
“hostilities” provision to the Obama Administration’s actions in Libya.  
This Note concludes that, although Zivotofsky I provides a basis for judicial re-
view of the legality of the Obama Administration’s “hostilities” determination (and, 
by extension, other questions of statutory interpretation related to foreign affairs), 
that review could be blunted by judicial deference to the executive branch’s factual 
determinations relevant to whether the Libyan airstrikes constituted “hostilities” 
within the War Powers Resolution. By addressing the political question doctrine’s 
history and the response to Zivotofsky I, this Note will explore whether the political 
question doctrine—particularly in cases of statutory interpretation—has lost some of 
its force as a justiciability doctrine. This Note will demonstrate that a court has prece-
dent to find the interpretation of the War Powers Resolution to be a justiciable ques-
tion post-Zivotofsky I, and it will examine whether a court would apply principles of 
executive branch fact deference to the executive branch’s interpretation of “hostili-
ties” and whether the statutory condition of “hostilities” in the War Powers Resolu-
tion is met.  
I. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
AND ITS EVOLUTION IN ZIVOTOFSKY V. CLINTON 
Since 1948, every President has refused to recognize any country as having sov-
ereignty over Jerusalem.16 Throughout those seven decades, the status of Jerusalem 
                                                                                                             
 
 13. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 14. Throughout this Note, I use the term “fact deference” or “executive branch fact def-
erence” to refer to arguments by the executive branch or by courts that judges should defer to 
the executive’s findings of fact in traditionally sensitive areas, including foreign affairs, na-
tional security, and war powers, if judges are going to decide those issues on the merits in the 
first place. This term is adapted from Robert Chesney’s original concept of “national security 
fact deference.” Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 
1362 (2009); see infra text accompanying notes 114–29. 
 15. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 16. Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2013). Recognition of the status of Jerusalem is not to be confused with recognition 
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has remained just one piece of the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine.17 
The U.S. State Department has consistently enforced this recognition decision by 
refusing to issue passports to American citizens born in Jerusalem with anything but 
“Jerusalem” listed as the applicant’s place of birth.18 In 2002, however, President 
George W. Bush signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA),19 
notwithstanding a provision that directed the State Department to list “Israel” as the 
birthplace for those applicants born in Jerusalem who request it on their U.S. pass-
ports.20 This section of the FRAA—section 214(d)—directly challenged the execu-
tive branch’s long-standing policy of neutrality21 regarding the sovereignty of 
Jerusalem.22 President Bush’s signing statement challenged the constitutionality of 
                                                                                                             
 
of Israel as a sovereign nation. President Truman formally recognized Israel as a sovereign 
nation in 1948. Statement by the President Announcing Recognition of the State of Israel, PUB. 
PAPERS 258 (May 14, 1948). President Truman’s statement did not, however, confer any for-
mal recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem, a status that “has long been, and re-
mains, one of the most sensitive issues in American foreign policy, and indeed . . . one of the 
most delicate issues in current international affairs.” Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2081; see infra 
note 17. 
 17. The status of Jerusalem is central to the ever-ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 
part because resolving whether Israel controls the territory is a necessary condition of achiev-
ing the “two-state solution” in Israel. See Sam F. Halabi, Jerusalem in the Courts and on the 
Ground, 26 FLA. J. INT’L L. 223, 225 (2014); Max Fisher, The Two-State Solution: What It Is 
and Why It Hasn’t Happened, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12 
/29/world/middleeast/israel-palestinians-two-state-solution.html [https://web.archive.org/web 
/20170506194234/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/world/middleeast/israel-palestinians 
-two-state-solution.html]. Traditionally, American foreign policy in Israel, along with that of 
the United Nations, has had the goal of achieving the two-state solution, dividing the contested 
territory between Israel and Palestine and establishing two independent states. Fisher, supra. 
Because both Israel and Palestine “claim Jerusalem as their capital and consider it a center of 
religious worship and cultural heritage,” the two-state solution cannot be achieved without 
resolving the status of Jerusalem. Id. U.S. neutrality toward the status of Jerusalem is 
consistent with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181, which “provided for the 
separation of the British Mandate of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states and carved out 
Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under the sovereignty of no state.” Halabi, supra, at 224 
(italics in original). For more on the history of U.S. policy toward Jerusalem, see generally id. 
See also CrashCourse, Conflict in Israel and Palestine: Crash Course World History 223, 
YOUTUBE (Jan. 28, 2015), https://youtu.be/1wo2TLlMhiw [https://perma.cc/3D44-2RC7].  
 18. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2082. 
 19. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 
Stat. 1350 (2002). 
 20. § 214(d), 116 Stat. 1366. 
 21. This is not the first time that Congress and the President have clashed over the status 
of Jerusalem since Israel declared its independence in 1948. In 1995, Congress enacted the 
Jerusalem Embassy Act, which was an attempt to force the executive branch to move the 
United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. Cara J. Grand, Zivotofsky v. Kerry: Of Passports, 
Politics, and Foreign Policy Powers, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 39, 42 (2015).  
 22. Zachary A. Kady, Note, Who Decides Where You’re Born? Zivotofsky v. Clinton and 
the Recognition of Foreign States, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 669 (2012). 
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section 214(d),23 arguing that it “would, if construed as mandatory rather than advi-
sory, impermissibly interfere with the President’s constitutional authority to . . . de-
termine the terms on which recognition is given to foreign states.”24 In direct oppo-
sition to Congress and section 214(d), both Presidents Bush and Obama refused to 
enforce the FRAA as it applied to passports for American citizens born in 
Jerusalem.25  
Menachem Zivotofsky was born an American citizen in Jerusalem in 2002.26 His 
parents sued when the State Department refused to comply with their request—pur-
suant to section 214(d)—that his birthplace be listed as “Israel” on his American 
passport.27 His parents filed suit to enforce his statutory rights in 2003,28 and his case 
spent almost twelve years in federal court before the Supreme Court finally resolved 
it in the summer of 2015.29 The District Court for the District of Columbia first 
dismissed the suit on the grounds that Zivotofsky lacked standing and that the case 
                                                                                                             
 
 23. While it may seem strange for a president to sign a law that he believes may be un-
constitutional, signing statements such as the one issued by President Bush in connection with 
the FRAA are increasingly common. See William Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 86 
IND. L.J. 303, 304, 319 (2011) (explaining that it has become common for Presidents to sign 
laws that they think are unconstitutional and that Presidents can clarify their views through 
signing statements). Presidents issue signing statements for a variety of reasons, including “to 
remind Congress of the president’s constitutional powers.” Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. 
Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 308 
(2006). In many of his signing statements containing constitutional objections to laws, Presi-
dent Bush “interpret[ed] statutory language that otherwise appear[ed] to be mandatory as being 
merely advisory” to avoid these constitutional problems. Id. at 319. President Bush was criti-
cized for what many call an abuse of the signing statement, as he challenged 172 laws with 
them, but President Obama continued the practice of sometimes issuing signing statements. 
Karen Tumulty, Obama Circumvents Laws with ‘Signing Statements,’ a Tool He Promised To 
Use Lightly, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-
circumvents-laws-with-signing-statements-a-tool-he-promised-to-use-lightly/2014/06/02/9d7 
6d46a-ea73-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html [https://perma.cc/M6K7-6BXY]. For an 
analysis of what Zivotofsky II means for the validity of signing statements, see CHARLIE 
SAVAGE, POWER WARS 671–72 (2015) (presenting the argument that the Supreme Court 
“implicitly” accepted presidents’ practice of issuing signing statements to “bypass provisions 
of bills they are signing into law, so long as their legal theories are credible ones”).  
 24. Reinstein, supra note 16, at 5 (omission in original) (quoting Statement on Signing 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1697, 1698 (Sept. 
30, 2002)).  
 25. Ryan M. Scoville, Compelled Diplomacy in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 148, 148 (2015).  
 26. Reinstein, supra note 16, at 5.  
 27. The initial lawsuit also claimed a violation of section 214(d) as it applied to 
Zivotofsky’s Consular Report of Birth Abroad. Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1425–26 (2012); 
Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015). By the time the case made its way to the Supreme 
Court a second time, though, Zivotofsky had dropped that part of his claim and was only con-
cerned with the birthplace designation on his passport. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 28. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. The Secretary of State, Nos. 03-1921, 032048, 2004 
WL 5835212, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004), rev’d in part, remanded in part, 444 F.3d 614 
(D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 29. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (decided June 8, 2015). 
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presented a nonjusticiable political question.30 The D.C. Circuit reversed the district 
court’s decision on standing but, after further factual development on remand, af-
firmed the district court’s dismissal on political question grounds, finding that the 
case asked the court to interfere with the President’s recognition power.31 
In Zivotofsky I, the Supreme Court reversed the finding that the case presented a 
nonjusticiable political question, as it only asked the Court to determine the correct 
interpretation of section 214(d), and statutory interpretation “is a familiar judicial 
exercise.”32 The Court remanded and instructed the lower courts to decide the case 
on the merits—essentially asking the courts to resolve the dispute between Congress 
and the President about the extent of the President’s recognition power and, in turn, 
the statute’s constitutionality.33  
Many scholars have debated the significance of the Court’s decision and ques-
tioned its likely impact on future political question doctrine claims, with some pre-
dicting that the decision will be read narrowly34 and others suggesting broader inter-
pretations, including that no question of statutory interpretation ever again will 
present a political question.35 One author has suggested that the opinion represents a 
rejection of the multifactor, prudential political question doctrine analysis in favor of 
the classical political question doctrine.36 Another took the reasoning a step further 
and argued that the evolution of the political question doctrine as expressed in 
Zivotofsky I “may increase the likelihood that lower courts find questions justiciable, 
particularly where federal statutes are involved.”37 Yet another went even further 
and argued “that the case supports a sweeping and significant rule: a claim to a fed-
eral statutory right can never present a political question.”38 
A. The Origins of the Political Question Doctrine 
The political question doctrine originated in Chief Justice Marshall’s landmark 
decision for the Court in Marbury v. Madison.39 There, the “judiciary gave itself . . . 
the duty to ‘say what the law is,’” with the result being that “the United States has 
                                                                                                             
 
 30. Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. at 1426. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1427. 
 33. Id. at 1431.  
 34. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Enabling a Constitutional Fight, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 26, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/opinion 
-analysis-enabling-a-constitutional-fight [https://perma.cc/48MW-M582] (suggesting that the 
case “might not require judges to second-guess major foreign policy choices”). 
 35. See, e.g., Chris Michel, Comment, There’s No Such Thing as a Political Question of 
Statutory Interpretation: The Implications of Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 123 YALE L.J. 253, 254 (2013)  
 36. Carol Szurkowski, Recent Development, The Return of Classical Political Question 
Doctrine in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012), 37 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 347, 348 (2014).  
 37. Samantha Goldstein, The Real Meaning of Zivotofsky and Its Impact on Targeted 
Killings Cases, 2 NAT’L SECURITY L.J. 147, 162 (2014) (emphasis added).  
 38. Michel, supra note 35, at 254 (emphasis in original).  
 39. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL 
ANSWERS 3 (1992).  
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found itself with the world’s most powerful judiciary.”40 In addition to adopting an 
expansive view of judicial authority, Marbury contains roots of the political question 
doctrine, or the first statement of what would become “a long-standing reluctance of 
U.S. judges to decide an entire category of serious disputes in which the legitimacy 
of an exercise of political power is questioned”41: 
Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and 
laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. 
. . . . 
But where [the head of a department] is directed by law to do a certain 
act affecting the absolute rights of individuals, in the performance of 
which he is not placed under the particular direction of the President, . . . 
it is not perceived on what ground the courts of the country are further 
excused from the duty of giving judgment, that right be done to an in-
jured individual . . . .42 
The Marbury Court thus endorsed judicial review of the constitutionality of 
ministerial executive actions—those that do not involve political discretion—but 
found judicial review of discretionary, or political, executive actions, in-
appropriate.43 Because the duty to deliver Marbury’s commission was assigned by 
law and was not a discretionary executive action, it was not a political question, and 
Marbury could seek a remedy through the courts.44 
The political question doctrine is one of several doctrines of justiciability—such 
as standing, ripeness, and mootness—that “define the judicial role” by “deter-
min[ing] when it is appropriate for the federal courts to review a matter and when it 
is necessary to defer to the other branches of government.”45 The political question 
doctrine does not prevent judicial review of questions simply because they might 
have “potentially significant policy consequences.”46 Rather, the doctrine directs 
courts to find that some questions are inappropriate for judicial review because they 
“are more effectively resolved by the political branches of government,”47 the 
political branches being Congress and the executive branch.48 Commentators have 
                                                                                                             
 
 40. FRANCK, supra note 39, at 10.  
 41. Id. at 11. 
 42. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170–71 (emphases added).  
 43. See Michel, supra note 35, at 254–55.  
 44. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; see also Gwynne Skinner, Misunderstood, Mis-
construed, and Now Clearly Dead: The “Political Question Doctrine” as a Justiciability Doc-
trine, 29 J.L. & POL. 427, 433 (2014).  
 45. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (5th ed. 2015). Other justiciability 
doctrines include: standing (“whether the plaintiff is the appropriate person to present the dis-
pute to the courts”); ripeness (“whether a dispute has progressed far enough to make judicial 
review appropriate”); and mootness (when “the dispute between the parties is stale”). DONALD 
L. DOERNBERG, C. KEITH WINGATE & DONALD H. ZIEGLER, FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERALISM, 
AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 23–24 (4th ed. 2008).  
 46. Goldstein, supra note 37, at 151. 
 47. Id. (quoting Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (1985)).  
 48. See HENKIN, supra note 9, at 26 (“In the governance of foreign relations, too, the 
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identified two primary versions of the political question doctrine employed by the 
federal courts throughout history: (1) the classical (or constitutional) political 
question doctrine and (2) the prudential political question doctrine.49 Both versions 
include factors that are disproportionately present in cases that involve foreign 
affairs, war powers, or national security.  
1. The Classical Political Question Doctrine 
The classical version of the political question is “invoked to dismiss cases only 
when the text and structure of the Constitution itself demand[] it.”50 Many commen-
tators trace this version of the political question doctrine back to the origins of the 
doctrine in Marbury, when Chief Justice Marshall defined “the role of the federal 
courts in the new constitutional system.”51 This early version of the political question 
doctrine “focused closely on constitutional text and structure” and was seen as 
“stem[ming] from the Constitution’s separation of powers.”52 Under the classical 
doctrine, a political question exists only if the Constitution’s text and structure desig-
nates another branch of government to make the decision before the court. If a politi-
cal question exists, courts will “treat[] certain well-defined . . . decisions by the po-
litical branches as final and binding.”53 But if the Constitution’s text and structure do 
not clearly indicate which branch of government is to make the decision, the courts 
have “not only the ability, but also the obligation to decide cases or controversies 
that [came] before them.”54 
2. The Prudential Political Question Doctrine 
The prudential political question doctrine originated when courts “began to con-
sider arguments from outside the four corners of the Constitution,” or nontextual and 
                                                                                                             
 
political authority of the United States is lodged in the President and Congress . . . .”).  
 49. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 37, at 150–55; Szurkowski, supra note 36, at 347–48. 
The classical political question doctrine is often also referred to as the “no power” theory; the 
prudential political question doctrine may also be referred to as the “discretionary” political 
question doctrine. Theodore Lawrence Craft, Note, Political Questions—Classical or Discre-
tionary Applications of Judicial Review?, 4 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 127, 128–29 (1969). In the 
context of the justiciability doctrines, “prudential” often refers to considerations that stem not 
from Article III constitutional and mandatory limitations on judicial power but from a court’s 
own considerations of “prudent judicial administration.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 42 (7th ed. 2016). It has never been clear whether the political question doctrine 
is a “constitutional” or “prudential” limitation, and the Supreme Court “has sometimes in-
voked both constitutional and prudential factors in finding cases to be a political question.” 
JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43834, THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: 
JUSTICIABILITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 6–8 (2014). 
 50. Szurkowski, supra note 36, at 347.  
 51. Id. at 352. 
 52. Id. at 353. 
 53. Goldstein, supra note 37, at 151 (alteration added) (omission in original) (quoting 
Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1999)).  
 54. Szurkowski, supra note 36, at 353. 
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nonstructural arguments, “when making political question determinations.”55 Baker 
v. Carr56 is widely recognized as the landmark case that established a multifactor test 
employing “prudential” concerns, as opposed to the less flexible nature of the clas-
sical approach, in deciding whether a case presents a nonjusticiable political 
question.57 
The plaintiffs in Baker asked the Supreme Court to declare that Tennessee’s ap-
portionment statute denied them equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 
by affecting the strength of their votes for state legislators.58 In the decades prior to 
Baker, courts (under the guise of the political question doctrine) consistently declined 
to get involved in questions of equal protection and apportionment, even when those 
schemes were “recognizably discriminatory.”59 
In changing course and deciding that the issue did not present a nonjusticiable 
political question, the Supreme Court instructed courts to conduct a “case-by-case 
inquiry,”60 applying a multifactor test that considers various prudential factors and 
“sought to identify cases that courts could hear (i.e., where jurisdiction is properly 
established) but should not hear because of the inappropriateness of the subject mat-
ter given the proper role and abilities of the Judiciary.”61 Where the classical version 
of the political question doctrine required courts to hear cases unless the decision at 
issue was constitutionally designated to another branch, the prudential version gives 
courts discretion to consider “extra-constitutional factors in determining whether 
they will exercise the power of review.”62  
After Baker v. Carr, a political question existed if the issue presented the 
following:  
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; [2] or a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it; [3] or the impossibility of de-
ciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion; [4] or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; [5] or an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made; [6] or the potentiality of 
                                                                                                             
 
 55. Id.  
 56. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 57. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 37, at 151 (referring to Baker as “the seminal case” in 
political question doctrine jurisprudence); Skinner, supra note 44, at 450 (arguing that the 
political question took on “new . . . life” after Baker); Szurkowski, supra note 36, at 354 (call-
ing Baker a “watershed case”). 
 58. Baker, 369 U.S. at 187–88.  
 59. See T. Rodman Layman, Aftermath of Baker v. Carr, 4 WM. & MARY L. REV. 93, 95–
97 (1963) (citing South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 
(1947) (per curiam); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)).  
 60. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
 61. Andrew Hand, Forbidden Territory or Well-Defined Boundaries? M.B.Z. v. Clinton 
and the Overzealous Application of the Political Question Doctrine, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 61, 64 (2011) (emphases in original).  
 62. Craft, supra note 49, at 129.  
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embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.63 
The first three factors embody the classical or mandatory version of the political 
question doctrine; the final three, the prudential factors.64 The factors are disjunctive, 
so the presence of any one factor gives a court discretion to dismiss a case as a non-
justiciable political question.65 In Baker, though, the Supreme Court found that the 
case did not present a nonjusticiable political question because it found none of the 
factors, classical or prudential, present.66 The plaintiffs were asking the Court only 
to determine whether a state law complied with the Constitution: 
We have no question decided, or to be decided, by a political branch of 
government coequal with this Court. Nor do we risk embarrassment of 
our government abroad, or grave disturbance at home if we take issue 
with Tennessee as to the constitutionality of her action here challenged. 
Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the Court 
to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable 
standards are lacking.67  
While the Court in Baker employed these factors and found that the equal protec-
tion issue did not present a political question, the prudential, multifactor analysis 
gives courts more discretion to dismiss a case as presenting a nonjusticiable political 
question.68 The Court has found only two cases post-Baker to present nonjusticiable 
political questions, but lower courts frequently apply the prudential political question 
doctrine, particularly in the area of foreign affairs.69 
3. The Political Question Doctrine in Questions of Foreign Affairs 
The historical reluctance of courts to resolve foreign affairs disputes between the 
political branches of government70 can be traced all the way back to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison.71 In introducing the political question 
doctrine, the Court singled out foreign affairs as an example of an area of politics 
into which courts should tread lightly:  
                                                                                                             
 
 63. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (numbering added).  
 64. See Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1432 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (referring 
to the final three factors as “address[ing] circumstances in which prudence may counsel 
against a court’s resolution of an issue presented”); see also Szurkowski, supra note 36, at 
355.  
 65. Id.; see also Hand, supra note 61, at 64.  
 66. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.  
 67. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 68. Szurkowski, supra note 36, at 355.  
 69. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 267–68, 267 n.158 
(2002).  
 70. HENKIN, supra note 48, at 132–33.  
 71. FRANCK, supra note 39, at 3.  
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By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with 
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use 
his own discretion, and is accountable only to his own country in political 
character and to his own conscience . . . . 
The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the 
act of congress for establishing the department of foreign affairs . . . . 
The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the 
courts.72 
In the centuries since, courts and even more executive branch lawyers have widely 
accepted this dicta as support for the principle “that foreign affairs are different from 
all other matters of state in some crucial fashion.”73 Because courts have historically 
been more hands-off in the realm of foreign affairs, “the most basic questions con-
cerning allocation of the foreign affairs power remain unanswered” by courts.74 
One explanation for this result is that some of the Baker factors—“constitutional 
commitment to the political branches, the need for fact-finding by the political 
branch, a lack of judicially manageable standards, and prudential considerations”75—
are inherently more likely to be tangled in the resolution of any foreign affairs de-
bate.76 Zivotofsky I was arguably such a case,77 but the Court declined to find a polit-
ical question in the statutory interpretation of section 214(d). This decision will be 
explored in Part I.B.  
B. Statutory Political Questions and Zivotofsky v. Clinton 
Scholars argue that Zivotofsky I represents a significant shift in the Court’s appli-
cation of the political question doctrine.78 Perhaps most striking, the majority opinion 
in Zivotofsky I did not consider the prudential factors by name or even acknowledge 
the Baker test as a precedential framework.79  
Justice Sotomayor concurred with the Court’s conclusion that the case did not 
                                                                                                             
 
 72. Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).  
 73. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Szurkowski, supra note 36, at 357. 
 74. Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the 
Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 215–16 (1985) (“Although the allocation 
question [of the foreign affairs power] is as old as the Constitution, the Supreme Court has 
made little effort to supply answers . . . .”); see also Theodore Y. Blumoff, Judicial Review, 
Foreign Affairs and Legislative Standing, 25 GA. L. REV. 227, 229 (1991) (“To which branch 
of government the Constitution consigns particular foreign relations powers—and how the 
courts should determine title to these powers—are questions that still defy simple answers.”). 
 75. Edwin B. Firmage, The War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 65, 67 (1977).  
 76. For example, courts have long applied functionalist approaches to separation of pow-
ers analyses in the realm of foreign affairs. Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: 
Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380, 384 (2015). Perhaps 
the prudential version of the political question doctrine more easily allows courts to take func-
tionalist concerns into consideration. 
 77. See Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1437–41 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the case presented a political question under the Baker factors). 
 78. See Michel, supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
 79. Szurkowski, supra note 36, at 358.  
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present a political question but wrote separately to contest the majority opinion’s 
omission of a Baker analysis.80 Her concurrence applied all six Baker factors, even-
tually concluding that the case only presented a question of constitutional and statu-
tory interpretation, which is “textually committed” to the judiciary.81 Justice Breyer 
shared Justice Sotomayor’s concerns about the majority opinion’s lack of Baker 
analysis and joined that part of her opinion; he ultimately dissented because he be-
lieved that under Baker, the case did present a political question, giving special 
weight to “prudential considerations.”82  
One commentator was similarly shocked by the lack of Baker-type prudential po-
litical question analysis because Zivotofsky I seemed to present an easy case for a 
nonjusticiable political question under the prudential factors:  
[I]f a court were to enforce the Foreign Relations Authorization Act in 
this case, it could effectively resolve one of the country’s most sensitive 
foreign relations questions: the political status of Jerusalem. Strong ar-
guments could be made that the fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors 
—which are present when a court’s decision could express a lack of re-
spect for coordinate branches of the federal government, when there is 
an “unusual” need for the court to adhere to a decision that has already 
been made, and when there is a potential for embarrassment to the United 
States resulting from the conflicting decisions of various branches 
—were all present in Zivotofsky.83 
Instead, the Zivotofsky I Court took a different approach, marking the political 
question doctrine as a “narrow exception” to the general rule that “the Judiciary has 
a responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those it ‘would gladly 
avoid.’”84 The Court emphasized “[t]he existence of a statutory right” as being rele-
vant to its decision: 
The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a foreign policy deci-
sion of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determina-
tion of what United States policy toward Jerusalem should be. Instead, 
Zivotofsky requests that the courts enforce a specific statutory right. To 
resolve his claim, the Judiciary must decide if Zivotofsky’s interpretation 
of the statute is correct, and whether the statute is constitutional. This is 
a familiar judicial exercise.85 
Returning to the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, the majority declared that 
“when an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution, ‘[i]t is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’”86 Just 
                                                                                                             
 
 80. Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1431 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 1435.  
 82. Id. at 1437 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 83. Szurkowski, supra note 36, at 358 (footnotes omitted).  
 84. Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. at 1427 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 
404 (1821)).  
 85. Id. (emphasis added).  
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as there is something different about foreign affairs and the political question doc-
trine, there is something different about statutory rights and the political question 
doctrine. Prior to Zivotofsky I, the Supreme Court had never found a political ques-
tion in a case involving a statutory claim, but lower courts had.87 Zivotofsky I likely 
gives lower courts less discretion to avoid the merits of tough separation of powers 
disputes involving statutory claims.88 
Many critics of the political question doctrine saw this as an improvement. For 
example, one author has suggested that by creating a general rule against political 
questions of statutory interpretation, Zivotofsky I “injects needed doctrinal clarity and 
vindicates fundamental values of separation of powers, access to courts, and execu-
tive compliance with the law.”89 If previous applications of the political question 
doctrine made it easy to find executive foreign affairs questions nonjusticiable, a rule 
against political questions of statutory interpretation could lead courts to be much 
more active in the area of foreign affairs, which could theoretically lead to greater 
executive compliance with the law.90 After all, the Supreme Court’s “role as the ul-
timate tiebreaker between the political branches helps sustain the constitutional 
order.”91 
A more active federal judiciary will seem like an improvement to those who see 
the political question doctrine as “operat[ing] asymmetrically in favor of the execu-
tive.”92 In other words, when a court finds a claim to present a political question, “the 
defendant wins and the status quo prevails.”93 When the central allegation is that the 
executive branch is not complying with a statute, we are right to be wary of judicial 
passivity, as the result is that Congress and individuals with statutorily protected 
rights and interests are without redress.94 A rule against statutory political questions 
prevents the executive branch from relying on faulty statutory interpretations to defy 
statutory commands without having to defend its interpretations on the merits.95 
Praise of a rule against statutory political questions is misguided, though, if it 
ignores the possibility that the judiciary will continue to legitimize illegal activity by 
a political branch of government by ruling in favor of that branch on the merits, pos-
sibly applying other modes of deference, such as executive branch fact deference.96 
Instructing lower courts to decide difficult questions on the merits does not 
necessarily mean that those courts will be any less deferential to the executive 
                                                                                                             
 
137, 177 (1803)).  
 87. Michel, supra note 35, at 256 (“[L]ower federal courts have increasingly embraced 
statutory political questions, especially as statutory claims against the executive multiplied 
after September 11, 2001.”). 
 88. COLE, supra note 49, at 22 (“[M]any lower federal courts have dismissed cases 
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 89. Michel, supra note 35, at 254.  
 90. See id. at 261.  
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 96. See infra Part III. 
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branch.97 At least one commentator expressed this fear post-Zivotofsky I, worrying 
that “judicial review might effectively act as a rubber stamp, solidifying even the 
most questionable of the Executive’s practices, without providing a real procedural 
check on his actions.”98 This will be explored in Part IV.  
II. FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE COURTS: SOME RECENT TRENDS AND EXPLANATIONS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Zivotofsky I is not necessarily out of line with 
many of its recent decisions in the realm of foreign affairs. Many scholars have 
recognized that in recent years, the Supreme Court has been more willing to tread 
into the waters of foreign affairs and has been somewhat less deferential to the politi-
cal branches in doing so.99 
For example, Professor Cohen identified a trend of the Roberts Court taking a 
more active role in deciding foreign affairs cases (such as cases involving enemy 
combatants and foreign sovereign immunity).100 Specifically, he found that in those 
cases, the Roberts Court “jettisoned its traditional functionalism in favor of formal-
ism.”101 Functionalist approaches to constitutional and statutory interpretation ques-
tions in the area of foreign affairs are more likely to favor the executive branch.102 
According to Cohen, as the Court began to see more cases come before it regarding 
President George W. Bush’s expansive views of his own executive authority, the 
Court became more “wary to give the Executive unfettered control of foreign affairs 
law, rejecting on multiple occasions the executive branch’s view of the law.”103 Simi-
larly, the Court seemed to be losing faith in Congress and its willingness “to play its 
constitutional role and check the President effectively.”104 Cohen calls this the “for-
malism of distrust,” or “the Court reasserting control and taming the political branches.”105 
                                                                                                             
 
 97. See Goldstein, supra note 37, at 195 (“[W]ith respect to foreign policy questions, 
courts—even when refusing to defer to the Executive on his claims of nonjusticiability—tend 
to be highly deferential to the President on the merits.”). 
 98. Id.  
 99. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 76; Dawn Johnsen, “The Essence of a Free Society”: The 
Executive Powers Legacy of Justice Stevens and the Future of Foreign Affairs Deference, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. 467 (2012). 
 100. Cohen, supra note 76, at 384. 
 101. Id. at 384–85. Courts often choose between “formal and functional tools” when de-
ciding constitutional and statutory interpretation. Id. at 391. Scholars have enumerated a num-
ber of ways to distinguish between the two approaches, but Cohen summarized the distinction 
as such: “Should the Constitution and statutes be interpreted strictly, to guarantee that all act 
within established rules and roles [formalistically], or broadly, with an eye towards achieving 
the government’s or Constitution’s goals [functionally]?” Id.  
 102. Id. at 395. One reason for this is that the executive branch can rely on “unique func-
tions of the President as ‘sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations’ to justify expansive Executive power.” Id. at 395 (footnote omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp, 229 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). Another is that so few foreign 
affairs powers are explicitly defined in the Constitution, making it difficult to rely on formal-
istic tools to answer questions of foreign affairs in favor of the President. Id. at 395–96. 
 103. Id. at 420.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 421. 
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Professor Johnsen also recognized a trend in the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
area of foreign affairs that she similarly saw as a reaction to the Bush 
Administration’s sweeping and expansive views of presidential authority.106 Even 
though “[f]oreign affairs, national security, [and] war powers . . . all top the list of 
areas in which the judiciary historically has practiced the greatest restraint and def-
erence in reviewing executive action,” the Court demonstrated that there are limits 
to that restraint and deference when it showed uncharacteristic willingness “to scru-
tinize and reject early Bush Administration policies regarding the detention and 
prosecution of those suspected of terrorism.”107 She attributed this to the legacy and 
leadership of Justice John Paul Stevens and argued that more recent silence from the 
Court on matters of detainee treatment can be attributed to Justice Stevens’s retire-
ment from the Court.108 Similar to Cohen, Johnsen also saw this trend as possibly 
motivated by “the exceptional circumstances surrounding [the] cases, and especially 
the Bush Administration’s flawed approach to its own constitutional authority.”109 
Therefore, in situations without these special factors (including, possibly, a different 
President), “the Court may afford significant deference to executive interpretations 
involving foreign affairs.”110  
These theories, among others, offer thorough analyses and explanations of a re-
cent trend, which is that, overall, federal courts have become more receptive to de-
ciding tough foreign affairs questions on their merits. They do not, however, explain 
the recent examples of executive branch fact deference as demonstrated in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project and Zivotofsky II. Cohen’s argument that the Supreme 
Court is increasingly moving toward a formalist approach to foreign affairs might 
explain the application of the political question doctrine in Zivotofsky I, but it simply 
cannot explain why the Supreme Court would then be willing to defer to executive 
branch findings of fact in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project and Zivotofsky II.111 
                                                                                                             
 
 106. See generally Johnsen, supra note 99.  
 107. Id. at 469. 
 108. Id. at 470–72, 472 (“Undoubtedly, Justice Stevens championed detainees’ rights and 
the rule of law while on the Court, and the loss of his passionate and principled voice inevitably 
altered internal Court dynamics on detainee issues.”). For example, Justice Stevens authored 
the Court’s opinion in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), holding that the federal habeas 
corpus statute applied to detainees at Guantánamo Bay. Johnsen, supra note 99, at 469–70. 
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 109. Johnsen, supra note 99, at 501.  
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been more silent in its review of detainee habeas corpus cases lately. Id. at 519. (“Not a single 
detainee has prevailed on appeal and secured release since the Supreme Court ordered habeas 
corpus review in Boumedine[ v. Bush] in 2008 . . . .”). 
 111. In fact, under Cohen’s theory, Zivotofsky II probably should have come out differ-
ently, as the majority opinion took a very functionalist approach to find that the recognition 
2017] EXECUTIVE BRANCH FACT DEFERENCE  1651 
 
Johnsen’s argument that the Supreme Court distrusted the Bush Administration’s le-
gal interpretations might explain its activism in certain kinds of post-9/11 cases and 
its more recent silence in those same cases, but it does not explain why the Supreme 
Court would once again begin to take a more active role in deciding questions of 
foreign affairs by scaling back its application of the political question doctrine.  
Part III of this Note is devoted to explaining the concept of executive branch fact 
deference and demonstrating that the Court implicitly relied on it in Humanitarian 
Law Project and Zivotofsky II.  
III. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH FACT DEFERENCE 
If the Supreme Court is truly moving away from applying the political question 
doctrine as a separation of powers principle,112 we must begin to wonder how that 
trend will interact with other trends in foreign affairs jurisprudence. As the rest of 
this Note will demonstrate, the increasing willingness of the courts to decide foreign 
affairs cases on the merits is meaningless without an accompanying change in the 
current deference given to the executive branch’s findings of fact in the realm of 
foreign affairs and national security. In fact, if both of these trends hold, the change 
in courts’ application of the political question doctrine may do more harm than good, 
as it will result in the courts “rubber stamping” and legitimizing actions of the exec-
utive branch that they previously might have found nonjusticiable.113 
Professor Robert Chesney coined the term “national security fact deference” to 
characterize arguments by the executive branch that judges should “defer to factual 
judgments made by the executive branch in litigation involving national security.”114 
As an initial matter, Chesney notes that some might object to the characterization of 
certain claims as being “national security” in nature because of traditional definitions 
associated with that term.115 However, his fact deference decision rule for judges is 
a four-part consideration of various factors that can be “appl[ied] by extension to fact 
deference claims having little or no relation to national security.”116 Therefore, even 
though his examples are primarily illustrative of fact deference in the realm of na-
tional security, it is not difficult to extrapolate principles from his theory to be applied 
to areas such as foreign affairs or war powers more generally.117  
Chesney’s theory for when judges will defer to executive branch findings of fact 
comprises four clusters of considerations: “core accuracy, weighted accuracy, pru-
dence, and legitimacy.”118 “Core accuracy” concerns institutional competency: a 
court is more likely to defer to another institution (i.e., political branch) when that 
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 113. See infra Parts III–IV.  
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 115. Id. at 1402.  
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institution is more competent in the given realm and more likely to resolve the issue 
in front of it accurately.119 “Weighted accuracy” concerns the possibility of error with 
respect to the gravity of the error: judges are likely to consider the weight of the 
interests at stake when making a decision, because “in some contexts there may be 
more harm in a false positive than a false negative.”120 “Prudence” includes such 
concerns as “efficiency, collateral impact, institutional self-preservation, and demo-
cratic accountability concerns.”121 For example, judges might be more likely to opt 
for fact deference when another branch has the advantage in speedy decision mak-
ing.122 Finally, concerns of “legitimacy” might arise when “various functional or pru-
dential factors warrant giving the authority to that institution,” or when a source of 
law—such as the Constitution—directly commits the decision to an institution.123 
The scenarios most relevant for Chesney in which the executive branch tends to 
argue for fact deference are individual eligibility for military detention, group com-
pliance with the law of war, the state secrets privilege, and military exigency and 
preparedness.124 Many fact deference cases involve claims by the executive (1) of 
various justiciability grounds to hearing the case and (2) that, in the alternative, the 
courts should at least defer to the executive’s findings of fact when deciding the 
merits.125  
Chesney gives United States v. Lindh as an example of his theory playing out in 
full force.126 The government argued for dismissal on political question grounds and, 
in the alternative, deference to the executive branch’s findings of fact.127 The gov-
ernment’s political question argument essentially rested on what it saw to be varying 
institutional competencies among the branches of government: the judiciary is 
simply not fit to make factual determinations “about conditions in an area of active 
combat operations,” and it should leave that task to the President, who has “multiple 
sources of information and intelligence about organization and structure of forces 
opposing the United States.”128 This sounds like the prudential version of the political 
question doctrine—but it is a version of the political question doctrine that the district 
court in Lindh rejected.129  
As Chesney notes, however, “it is one thing to insist that there must be some form 
of judicial review, and quite another to say that such review must be non-
deferential.”130 The government alternatively argued that the President’s determina-
tion of Lindh’s eligibility for immunity under the Geneva Conventions deserved def-
erence under “a doctrine calling for courts to defer to the President’s interpretation 
                                                                                                             
 
 119. Id. at 1393.  
 120. Id. at 1395.  
 121. Id. at 1397.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 1399.  
 124. Id. at 1366.  
 125. See id. at 1367.  
 126. Id. at 1371 (citing United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002)).  
 127. Id. at 1373–74.  
 128. Id. at 1374–75.  
 129. Id. at 1375.  
 130. Id. 
2017] EXECUTIVE BRANCH FACT DEFERENCE  1653 
 
of ambiguous treaty language.”131 The district court did accept that argument 
—thereby reaching, functionally, the same result as if it had dismissed the case as a 
nonjusticiable political question: Lindh lost his argument for immunity.132 
Chesney is not the only scholar to attempt to categorize judicial deference to the 
political branches. Professor William Eskridge and Lauren Baer categorized a con-
tinuum of deference regimes employed by the Supreme Court when it is asked to 
defer to executive branch interpretation of a statute.133 They found the “strongest 
form of deference” in cases involving foreign affairs and national security, labeling 
it “Curtiss-Wright Super-Deference” after United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp.134 According to Eskridge and Baer’s empirical analysis, the arena of foreign 
affairs and national security is one where the judiciary frequently defers to the exec-
utive branch’s interpretation of statutes, even if the Court does not mention Curtiss-
Wright explicitly, instead “go[ing] along with legally weak executive department ar-
guments in cases involving foreign affairs or national security.”135 
A. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: Defining “Material Support” 
and “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” 
The 2010 case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project136 is an instructive exam-
ple of the theories of executive branch fact deference at play in a case that may not 
have raised separation of powers concerns on its face. The plaintiffs in Humanitarian 
Law Project brought a First Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which 
criminalizes the provision of “material support or resources” to organizations 
deemed “foreign terrorist organization[s]” (FTOs).137 They wanted to provide mon-
etary support for the humanitarian and political activities of two groups that were 
deemed FTOs and argued that § 2339B violated the First Amendment because it 
criminalizes all support given to FTOs, even if the plaintiffs did not intend to “further 
the unlawful ends of those organizations.”138 
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of the Treasury, has the power to designate which organizations are con-
sidered FTOs for purposes of § 2339B.139 The Secretary has discretion to designate 
an organization as an FTO “upon finding that it is foreign, engages in ‘terrorist ac-
tivity’ or ‘terrorism,’ and thereby ‘threatens the security of United States nationals 
or the national security of the United States.’”140 Technically, an organization that 
has been deemed an FTO has the right to appeal that decision in the D.C. Circuit, but 
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that right appears—in practice—to be limited. That court has twice asked the Secre-
tary of State to “convene a hearing” to allow the FTO to challenge its status, but it 
“has so far refused to review the Secretary’s determination that an FTO threatens the 
security of U.S. nationals or American national security, effectively insulating that 
type of political question from judicial review.”141 Therefore, it appears that courts 
give the Secretary of State’s determination that a particular group is an FTO great 
fact deference.  
The Supreme Court applied “rigorous scrutiny”142 and upheld the statute as ap-
plied to the plaintiffs against the First Amendment challenge. The decision relied not 
only on the Secretary of State’s determination that the groups at issue were FTOs but 
also on the finding that all support to an FTO is “material support”—namely, that 
“money is fungible, and that the terrorist organizations—in general—are not known 
for erecting institutional ‘firewalls’ to prevent commingling of funds between their 
nonviolent and violent wings.”143 Therefore, the plaintiffs could not donate any 
money for any purpose—even a peaceful one—to an organization deemed an FTO 
without violating § 2339B. Professor Said criticized this portion of the Court’s opin-
ion for its reliance on only a few sources for this assertion, two of which were (1) an 
affidavit by a State Department official, and (2) a book by a former Treasury 
Department official.144 Justice Breyer noted as much in his dissent when he argued 
that “the Government has provided us with no empirical information that might con-
vincingly support this claim.”145 
In short, as Professor Said writes:  
Once the Secretary of State declares that a group is an FTO, the group 
becomes so toxic and irredeemable that any coordinated activity that 
contributes to the nebulous quality of legitimacy is illegal. Arguments 
about the justness of the FTO’s cause are rejected as justification for ter-
rorism, and any attempts to encourage the FTO to eschew violence are 
viewed as naïve ruses intended to allow a group to continue its violent 
mission surreptitiously.146 
While the foreign affairs question in Humanitarian Law Project involved the co-
operation of Congress and the executive branch (Congress to enact the statute, and 
the Secretary of State to determine which groups qualify for FTO status)—and not 
the opposition of Congress to an executive branch foreign affairs or national security 
policy—the decision in Humanitarian Law Project raises troubling questions about 
the level of executive branch fact deference the Supreme Court will show the politi-
cal branches of government in cases involving national security and foreign affairs. 
This deference regime may just be another way for the courts to avoid getting 
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involved in foreign affairs and national-security politics, just as the political question 
doctrine is. 
B. Executive Branch Fact Deference as a Separation of Powers Principle: The New 
Political Question Doctrine in Action in Zivotofsky v. Kerry 
When Menachem Zivotofsky’s passport case made it back to the Supreme Court 
(after almost twelve years), the Supreme Court found itself tasked with resolving a 
dispute between the political branches of government. Not surprisingly,147 the ma-
jority invoked the familiar tripartite framework from Justice Jackson’s concurring 
opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:148  
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authori-
zation of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all 
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . .  
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant 
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, 
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have con-
current authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . . .  
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for 
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any con-
stitutional powers of Congress over the matter.149 
The Secretary of State acknowledged that the executive branch’s policy of refus-
ing to enforce section 214(d)150 put the President in category three—in which his 
power was at “its lowest ebb.”151 Even acknowledging that claims in this third cate-
gory must be “scrutinized with caution,”152 the Supreme Court went on to strike down 
section 214(d) as unconstitutionally infringing on what it saw to be the “President’s 
exclusive recognition power.”153 It was the first time in history that the Supreme 
Court “accepted a President’s direct defiance of an Act of Congress in the field of 
foreign affairs.”154 More notably, the decision marks only the second time in the his-
tory of the Constitution that the Supreme Court has found a nonenumerated executive 
branch power to be exclusive (the other being the power to remove executive officials).155 
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To be clear, there is no explicit language of deference to the executive branch in 
the majority opinion of Zivotofsky II. In fact, the majority actually rejected the broad-
est form of the executive branch’s argument regarding its powers in foreign affairs, 
which is that the President “has ‘exclusive authority to conduct diplomatic relations,’ 
along with ‘the bulk of foreign-affairs powers.’”156 Instead, the majority purports to 
confine its statement of executive authority to that of the recognition power alone.157  
Still, the majority opinion’s acceptance of various other arguments is an exercise 
of executive branch fact deference. For example, the majority accepted the executive 
branch’s assertion that enforcing section 214(d) would infringe on the president’s 
recognition powers by irreparably signaling a shift in America’s recognition policy 
regarding the status of Jerusalem.158 The executive branch argued that listing “Israel” 
on passports for citizens born in Jerusalem would have disastrous foreign affairs con-
sequences in the area of conflict.159 However, the debate surrounding section 214(d) 
is remarkably analogous to the debate surrounding the Taiwan Relations Act,160 part 
of which “directed the Secretary of State to permit United States citizens born in 
Taiwan to list ‘Taiwan’ as their place of birth on their passports, despite the fact that 
the United States did not recognize Taiwan as a foreign state.”161 In response, the 
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State Department complied with the law, while “issuing a formal policy declaration 
stating that its ‘one-China’ policy had not changed despite the new passport legisla-
tion.”162 Despite this historical precedent involving formal recognition decisions and 
passports, the Supreme Court went on to hold that requiring the Secretary of State to 
list “Israel” on passports for citizens born in Jerusalem would force the President to 
contradict his own recognition determination (even though, as the majority recog-
nized, “the statement required by § 214(d) would not itself constitute a formal act of 
recognition”).163 
The majority of the Court’s opinion is devoted to the consideration of whether the 
recognition power lies exclusively in the President,164 and this Note does not address 
whether that decision was correct on the merits. To be sure, reasonable minds can 
and have differed on the issue of whether the recognition power lies exclusively in 
the executive branch,165 and U.S. policy toward Jerusalem and Israel will continue to 
remain a delicate and sensitive issue.166 Instead, this Note attempts to address the 
process by which the majority arrived at its decision in order to show that the major-
ity exhibited patterns of deference to the executive branch. That process has already 
been criticized by Jack Goldsmith, who argues that the decision will be read by 
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executive branch lawyers “generously in favor of the President in resolving everyday 
foreign policy disputes between the political branches.”167  
Goldsmith, too, criticizes not the conclusion regarding the recognition power, but 
the process by which the Court arrived at that conclusion.168 Because the parties were 
in Zone 3 of Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework,169 if the President wanted to go 
against Congress’s explicit will, he would need to rely on his independent constitu-
tional powers, so the conclusion that the recognition power lies exclusively with the 
president is extremely significant for the analysis—and Goldsmith sees flaws in the 
Court’s logic in that section of its opinion.170 For example, the Court relied solely on 
its interpretation of Article II of the Constitution without even analyzing Congress’s 
Article I powers.171 Additionally, the Court made no mention of who bears the burden 
of proving the exclusive nature of the President’s power in Zone 3.172 “If anything, 
the Court reversed the burden by accepting weak arguments for an exclusive presi-
dential power over recognition without even considering the ‘constitutional powers 
of Congress over the matter,’ as [Zone] Three appeared to require.”173 
Goldsmith also criticizes the second part of the majority opinion—that section 
214(d) is unconstitutional because a passport birthplace recognition actually in-
fringes on the recognition power—going as far as to describe that section of the opin-
ion as having “no legal analysis.”174 Justice Scalia says as much in his dissent, ac-
cusing the majority of “announc[ing] a rule that is blatantly gerrymandered to the 
facts of this case.”175 Justice Scalia criticizes the opinion for “identif[ying] no reason 
to believe that the United States—or indeed any other country—uses the place-of-
birth field in passports and birth reports as a forum for performing the act of 
recognition.”176 
Justice Scalia and Professor Goldsmith criticize the majority opinion for many of 
the same reasons that Justice Breyer and Professor Said criticize the majority opinion 
in Humanitarian Law Project: both opinions are said to have relied on weak legal 
arguments and scant factual evidence to arrive at favorable conclusions for the exec-
utive branch. In this way, executive branch fact deference performs a role similar to 
that of the political question doctrine. Instead of relying on the political question 
doctrine—which is “essentially a function of the separation of powers”177—the ma-
jority opinions arrived at the same end result by deferring to executive branch find-
ings of fact, even without saying explicitly that they were giving the executive branch 
any deference at all.  
Humanitarian Law Project and Zivotofsky II are examples of why a return to the 
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classical political question doctrine178—giving courts less discretion to dismiss cases 
on justiciability grounds—may not actually lead to more rulings in favor of plaintiffs 
on the merits. Samantha Goldstein predicted as much post-Zivotofsky I and pre-
Zivotofsky II, arguing that “Zivotofsky’s weakly pro-justiciability adoption of the 
classical theory” may send a signal to lower courts that “they should resolve skir-
mishes between the political branches, even in the context of foreign affairs,” but 
that when those lower courts actually decide those cases, they are likely to be 
deferential to the executive branch on the merits.179  
The idea that courts may be better off not reviewing these kinds of issues at all is 
not new—it was expressed as early as 1944 by Justice Jackson in his dissent in 
Korematsu v. United States.180 When the majority upheld a military order excluding 
Japanese Americans from certain West Coast military areas, Justice Jackson ex-
pressed fear that courts would have no choice but to rule in favor of the military in 
all such cases, because “military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent judicial 
appraisal,” and courts would be required to defer to scant evidence and military judg-
ments instead of making their own independent judgments about whether the orders 
have “a reasonable basis in necessity.”181 In Justice Jackson’s view, that is worse 
than not deciding the case at all: 
[C]ourts can never have any real alternative to accepting the mere decla-
ration of the authority that issued the order that it was reasonably neces-
sary from a military viewpoint.  
 Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for de-
porting and detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial 
construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far 
more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself.182 
In other words, if courts want to defer to the executive branch, perhaps it is better 
for them to do so by applying the political question doctrine (or another justiciability 
doctrine) and not decide the merits of the case, as opposed to rejecting a justiciability 
argument but deferring to the executive branch on the merits. Both approaches would 
reach the same result, but the justiciability approach avoids setting a precedent of 
deference through substantive doctrine (in Humanitarian Law Project, First Amend-
ment doctrine; in Zivotofsky, constitutional doctrine). 
IV. MOVING FORWARD: THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
FACT DEFERENCE, AND THE EXISTENCE OF “HOSTILITIES” 
Prior to Zivotofsky I, legal scholars had suggested that whether war or armed con-
flict exists was a nonjusticiable political question.183 In an article examining the jus-
ticiability of two statutes with various triggers related to the existence of hostilities—
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the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA) and the 2001 Authorization to Use 
Military Force (AUMF)—Professor Deborah Pearlstein suggests that Zivotofsky I 
affects that assumption by clarifying the courts’ role in determining whether the ex-
istence-of-hostilities trigger in those statutes is met.184 According to Pearlstein, “If 
the Constitution’s promise of democratic governance means anything, then surely it 
means that the political branches should have fundamental control over whether we 
are or are not at war.”185 She suggested that while the existence of hostilities under 
the MCA and AUMF is not a political question, courts may “cede some of their in-
terpretive authority” of the statutes and defer to the political branches on the 
existence-of-hostilities trigger out of this respect for the “constitutional scheme” and 
the separation of powers.186 Pearlstein cites Chesney’s theory of “national security 
fact deference” as one such mode of deference that would allow courts to decide on 
the merits whether the factual conditions for the existence of hostilities have been 
met without disturbing the executive branch’s conclusions.187  
Ultimately, though, Pearlstein concludes that in the contexts of the MCA and the 
AUMF, “it is far from clear that deference to the executive on the existence of hos-
tilities . . . invariably advances any of the separation-of-powers purposes” discussed 
in her article: democratic accountability and the promotion of governmental effec-
tiveness.188 Deference does not promote accountability of the executive branch be-
cause in the national security context, when the executive branch tends to shroud 
itself in secrecy, “the involvement of multiple branches may be required to make 
accountability possible at all.”189 Pearlstein also argues that the promotion of gov-
ernmental effectiveness should not “require[] categorical deference to the execu-
tive’s factual assertions” and that the executive branch should, at a minimum, “have 
a reasonable basis for its conclusions.”190 Her ultimate conclusion is that “uncritical 
deference serves no constitutional end—even at the threshold of war,” and courts 
should be hesitant to abdicate their traditional role in statutory interpretation just be-
cause foreign affairs and war are involved.191 
Pearlstein is probably correct that, in the contexts of the MCA and the AUMF, the 
existence of hostilities is likely not a political question. Similarly, the existence of 
hostilities under the War Powers Resolution—especially post-Zivotofsky I—is likely 
not a political question. President Obama claimed that his statutory interpretation of 
the War Powers Resolution allowed him to continue with air strikes past the sixty-
day timeline established by the War Powers Resolution; Congress disagreed. It is the 
courts’ role “to say what the law is.”192 If President Obama’s interpretation of the 
War Powers Resolution “hostilities” provision had been challenged in court, the 
courts could have applied Zivotofsky I, concluding that the presence of a statute is 
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relevant to the justiciability of the case—especially if, as some commentators have 
urged, Zivotofsky I creates a general rule against statutory political questions.193 
An important caveat to this discussion is that, of course, the political question 
doctrine is just one justiciability doctrine employed by courts in the area of foreign 
affairs to avoid deciding cases on the merits.194 This Note does not attempt to predict 
how a court might decide any number of these other questions. For example, it is 
entirely possible that a court might dismiss a suit brought to challenge the War 
Powers Resolution for lack of standing or lack of ripeness. This Note merely attempts 
to explain how a court faced with an argument that such a suit involves a non-
justiciable political question might decide the issue.  
But if various deference theories are correct,195 then courts may reject arguments 
about justiciability and then just find ways to defer to the executive branch’s inter-
pretation of the “hostilities” provision. Pearlstein’s argument that courts should not 
use deference to executive branch findings of fact as a separation of powers principle 
may seem attractive to those who favor a more active judiciary, but it does not mean 
that courts will actually challenge, in any meaningful way, executive branch posi-
tions like the Obama Administration’s interpretation of the “hostilities” provision. If 
a court were to apply Zivotofsky I, deciding that such a case does present a political 
question, it may end up deferring to the executive branch’s interpretation anyway. 
That would legitimize what many commentators have called a questionable exercise 
of statutory interpretation by the executive branch,196 perhaps meaning that it would 
be better for the courts not to get involved at all.  
CONCLUSION 
Zivotofsky I demonstrates that the Supreme Court is growing hostile to statutory 
political questions and may send a signal to lower courts that they should be deciding 
cases involving statutory interpretation on the merits, even when doing so means that 
courts will have to resolve sticky separation of powers disputes involving foreign 
affairs. Many commentators have urged that such a rule against statutory political 
questions is good for plaintiffs seeking to hold the political branches accountable to 
legal limits, but such a rule is meaningless without an accompanying change in the 
deference shown to the executive branch in the area of foreign affairs. Quite the op-
posite, Zivotofsky I creates the risk that deferential review may be worse than courts 
not deciding the cases at all, as Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project and Zivotofsky 
II demonstrate. 
The election of President Donald Trump has complicated any discussion of exec-
utive authority, foreign affairs, or national security. Regardless of how one views his 
political positions, it is impossible to deny that the first several months of the Trump 
presidency have been tumultuous at best. The response to President Trump’s first 
iteration of immigration reform is an instructive example of how courts and Congress 
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might respond to claims of broad executive authority in the future of the Trump presi-
dency. One week into his presidency, President Trump signed an executive order 
blocking the entry into the United States of persons from seven Muslim-majority 
countries.197 Protests erupted as would-be immigrants were detained at airports all 
across the country,198 prompting an immediate legal assistance effort from volunteer 
attorneys ready to draft and file habeas corpus petitions on behalf of the detained 
migrants.199 Amidst the public outcry, Congress was not entirely silent; Democratic 
members were of course vocal about their opposition, but so, too, were several 
prominent Republicans, including Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham.200 
Federal courts played a particularly prominent role in the controversy, with one strik-
ing down parts of the order the day after it was issued,201 and a Ninth Circuit panel 
unanimously affirming a different district court’s preliminary injunction in a consti-
tutional challenge to the ban.202  
Most relevant for this Note, the Ninth Circuit seemed to be concerned with the 
Trump Administration’s broad claims of executive authority and insulation from ju-
dicial review on the core constitutional claims.203 The decision ultimately prompted 
the administration to commit to repealing the offending executive order and replac-
ing it with something that satisfied the courts’ constitutional concerns, only two 
weeks after the order was first put in place.204 The Ninth Circuit’s particular concern 
                                                                                                             
 
 197. See Liam Stack, Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration: What We Know and What 
We Don’t, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/trump 
-refugee-ban-muslim-executive-order.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20170428215212/https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/trump-refugee-ban-muslim-executive-order.html].   
 198. See, e.g., Massive Protests at Airports Across US After Trump’s Immigration Ban, 
N.Y. POST (Jan. 29, 2017, 12:13 AM), http://nypost.com/2017/01/29/massive-protests-erupt 
-at-airports-across-us-after-trumps-immigrant-ban [https://perma.cc/8HSN-Y7KT].  
 199. See, e.g., Elise Viebeck & Michael Laris, Hundreds of Lawyers Descend on Airports 
To Offer Free Help After Trump’s Executive Order, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017, 7:20 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hundreds-of-lawyers-descend-on-airports-to-offer 
-free-help/2017/01/29/55ef11b2-e64b-11e6-bf6f-301b6b443624_story.html [https://perma.cc 
/RDX5-4YXP].  
 200. Madeline Farber, Here Are the Republicans Who Have Criticized President Trump’s 
Immigration Ban, FORTUNE (Jan. 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/29/donald-trump 
-immigration-ban-republicans [https://perma.cc/8XYR-WJTH].  
 201. Michael D. Shear, Nicholas Kulish & Alan Feuer, Judge Blocks Trump Order on 
Refugees Amid Chaos and Outcry Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/refugees-detained-at-us-airports-prompting-legal-challenges-to-trumps 
-immigration-order.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20170509000913/https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/01/28/us/refugees-detained-at-us-airports-prompting-legal-challenges-to-trumps 
-immigration-order.html]. 
 202. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Charlie Savage, 6 
Highlights from the Ruling on Trump’s Immigration Order, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/trump-travel-ban-ninth-circuit-ruling.html [https://web.archive 
.org/web/20170227093819/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/trump-travel-ban-ninth 
-circuit-ruling.html]. 
 203. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1161. 
 204. Jaweed Kaleem & Maura Dolan, Trump Says He’ll Repeal Travel Ban, Replace It 
with a New One Next Week That’s ‘Tailored’ to Court Decisions, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017, 
11:52 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates 
2017] EXECUTIVE BRANCH FACT DEFERENCE  1663 
 
with and attention to the Trump Administration’s overreaching claims of executive 
unreviewable authority and entitlement to deference205 demonstrate the court’s un-
ease with claims for deference in certain content areas. Most notably, the court 
stressed that while “our jurisprudence has long counseled deference to the political 
branches on matters of immigration and national security, neither the Supreme Court 
nor our court has ever held that courts lack the authority to review executive action 
in those arenas for compliance with the Constitution.”206 It is impossible to know 
whether the Trump Administration would have received the executive branch fact 
deference it asked for had it not also claimed insulation from any kind of review, but 
it is clear that, in the face of what they see as clear constitutional violations, courts 
may still be willing to question executive branch factual determinations.  
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